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LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT*
ALLAOUA LA4YEB**
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the problem of mercenaries is as old as history itself, very
little legal analysis of the phenomenon exists today. History books re-
count the exploits of mercenaries from ancient Egypt through Swiss
mercantile mercenarism to modern mercenarism, as exemplified in the
Congo. Lawyers, however, have generally refrained from analyzing the
issues in a sufficient manner, and until recently, a legal definition of a
mercenary did not exist.
Mercenary activity has taken on a new dimension since the second
half of the twentieth century. Hitherto, mercenaries were employed by
governments and factions in civil wars. Since the 1960s, however, mer-
cenaries have been increasingly employed and paid by foreigners either
to influence the outcome of a conflict in their favor, such as in Angola
(1975-76),' or to initiate a situation which would protect their interest,
* This Article is a revised version of part of the unpublished Ph.D. thesis "The
Development of International Law in Relation to the Legal Status of Mercenaries"
submitted to the University of London in November 1986. Supervisor was Professor
Rosalyn Higgins, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and
Political Science, who also kindly read through this Article.
** Licence en Droit 1976, Universitd de Constantine; Diploma in International Law
1983; Ph.D. 1987, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of
London; Co-Founder of the African Society of International and Comparative Law 1987-
Present; Treasurer 1986-1988.
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such as the invasions of Guinea (1970) or Benin (1977).2 The problem
was less prominent in the 1980s but has by no means disappeared, and
concrete legal analysis of the subject should be taken more seriously.
The mercenary phenomenon can be controlled by developing
international standards through multilateral conventions, and by enacting
effective state legislation to control the activities of mercenaries. This
Article examines United States legislation, a major supplier of mer-
cenaries, and will demonstrate that this legislation is ineffective in
controlling mercenary activity. The United States legislation is ineffective
for two reasons. First, it was enacted at a time when neutrality of states
in foreign internal armed conflict became a norm in international law.
Thus, the legislation was designed to restrict the freedom of United
States citizens to enlist in the military or naval services of foreign states.
Second, a new form of mercenary activity appeared on the international
scene by the 1960s. Mercenaries were no longer recruited by states into
national armies, but by individuals and interest groups who sought to
influence the outcome of an internal conflict or to instigate such a
conflict. Recruitment of mercenaries by individuals was clearly not
envisaged by the draftsmen of the United States legislation, which does
not even refer to the term "mercenary."
Given the lack of a reference to mercenaries in its legislation, the
United States has become unable to prevent its citizens from joining
mercenary groups fighting in Africa. For example, in 1976, matters came
to a head in Angola where some British mercenaries were massacred by
their fellow mercenaries who, in turn, were captured by the Angolan
Government.3 They were tried for engaging in mercenary activities,
massacring their fellow mercenaries and murdering Angolan soldiers and
civilians. All were found guilty.' Among those sentenced to death was
a United States citizen; two others received long prison sentences.5
This Article will focus on two major issues pertaining to the United
States treatment of mercenary activity. First, it will analyze whether the
United States legislation is adequate enough to deal with modern
manifestations of mercenary activity and whether this legislation
adequately comports with emerging international norms on the subject.
Angolan Civil War, 20 ORBis 669, 691 (1976); Marcum, Lessons of Angola, 54 FOREIGN AFt.
407, 417 (1976).
2. Cassese, Mercenaries: Lawful Combatants or War Criminals?, 40 ZAoRV 1, 2-3 (1980);
Complaints by Guinea against Portugal, 1970 U.N.Y.B. 187, U.N. Sales No. E.72.I.1.
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1976, at Al, col. 6.
4. Peter, Mercenaries and International Humanitarian Law, 24 INDIAN . INT'L L. 373, 387-
88 (1984); Note, The Laws of War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs
of War, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 323, 328 (1977).
5. Cesner & Brant, Law of the Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REV.
339 (1977); Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger, DEP'T ST. BULL. (July 10, 1976).
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Second, it will analyze the interpretation of United States legislation by
its courts, specifically whether it is necessary to recognize belligerents in
order for the legislation to apply.
II. THE DEFINITION OF MERCENARIES
Although United States legislation does not mention the term
"mercenary," it includes activity which, for modern purposes, is con-
sidered mercenary activity. 6 A particular difficulty with this legislation
arises with the treatment of enlistment. Although the United States
legislation appears to prohibit enlistment inside and out of the United
States, the courts hold that only enlistment within United States territory
is within their jurisdiction. United States citizens who have enlisted
abroad have escaped penal sanction under the law.
Few other countries define the term "mercenary" in their domestic
laws. Thus, it is helpful to highlight a definition of the term on the
international level. Article 47(2) of Protocol I Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions contains a compromise definition.7 Under article
47(2), a mercenary is a person who:
(a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order
to take part in an armed conflict in a country
other than his own;
(b) does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities
essentially by the desire for private gain and, in
fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to
the conflict, material compensation substantially
in excess of that promised or paid to combatants
of similar ranks and functions in the armed
forces of the recruiting party;
(d) is neither a national nor a resident of the State
in which he operates;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party
to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a party
to the conflict on official duty as a member of
its armed forces.8
This definition is highly controversial, and prompted the United
Nations to establish a committee in 1979 to draft an international
convention against the recruitment, use, financing, and training of mer-
6. 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988).
7. 16 LL.M. 1412 (1977).
8. Id (emphasis added).
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cenaries. 9 The definition espoused by the Geneva Convention, however,
remains an important guide to the identification of a mercenary.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION
A. Historical Roots
The United States has had a long tradition of legislation controlling
foreign recruitment and enlistment of its own nationals in foreign forces.
Earlier laws were inspired by a pragmatic decision to keep the newly
established republic out of the struggles in Europe. In addition, a gen-
eral antipathy existed toward the use of mercenaries, due to the unpleas-
ant experiences the United States had with the Hessian and Hanoverian
soldiers (mercenaries) who fought for the British during the American
Revolutionary War.
Early in its history, the United States addressed the issue of hostile
military expeditions by passing the Neutrality Act of 1794 (the "1794
Act").10 This law was enacted under President George Washington and
regulated the enlistment of citizens of one country into the army of
another in an effort to ensure sound international relations. Section 1
of the 1794 Act prohibited the enlistment of United States citizens in
foreign armies,"' and a misdemeanor was committed
9. Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against Activities of
Mercenaries, GA. Res. 34/140, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979), reprinted in [1979] 33 U.N.Y.B. 1152, U.N. Sales No. E.82.I.1. The Ad Hoc Com-
mittee is still in the process of drafting this international convention. For details on its
work, see its annual reports: 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/36/43 (1981);
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/37/43 (1982); 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43),
U.N. Doc. A/38/43 (1983); 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/39/43 (1984); 40
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/40/43 (1985); 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43),
U.N. Doc. A/41/43 (1986); 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/42/43 (1987).
10. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381,381-82. The immediate objective of the
Neutrality Act was to prevent United States citizens from enlisting in the French army
during the Anglo-French War. The United States believed that a neutral state had a duty
to prevent its subjects from enlisting in the service of a belligerent. This legislation was
enacted, however, following the involvement of United States citizens in this war. In 1793,
Gideon Henfield, a United States citizen, took service on board a French privateer and
arrived at Philadelphia as a prizemaster of a British ship captured in battle. He was in-
dicted under common law, and Mr. Justice Wilson charged the jury that Henfield was bound
to take no part in any act which could injure his country. Therefore, he was bound to keep
the peace towards all nations at peace with the United States. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas.
1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360). Similarly, another United States citizen, Mr. Isaac
Williams, was convicted for accepting a commission under the French Republic, and, under
its authority, committing acts of hostility against Great Britain which was at amity with the
United States. Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708).
11. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381. The subsequent United States practice
confirmed the territorial character of this legislation.
[Vol. 10
U.S. MERCENARY ACTIVI7Y
if any citizen of the United States ...within the teritoty or
jurisdiction of the same, accepted and exercised a commission to
serve a foreign prince or state in war by land or sea, the person
so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and
shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, and shall be
imprisoned not exceeding three years.12
Section 5 of the 1794 Act further provided that it was a high mis-
demeanor for any person within the territory or jurisdiction of the United
States to "begin or set on foot or provide or prepare the means for any
military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the
territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state with whom the
United States are at peace .... 13
In Gelston v. Hoyt,14 the Court held that the 1794 Act did not apply
to the fitting out of a vessel to cruise against a new state which had not
been recognized by the United States."5 Although the 1794 Act was ini-
tially passed as a temporary measure, due to difficulties experienced by
the United States in maintaining strict neutrality in the wars of the
French Revolution, it was perpetuated by the Neutrality Act of April 24,
1800 (the "1800 Act").16 The 1800 Act, however, did not solve the mer-
cenary problem. Consequently, subsequent laws broadening the scope of
the 1794 and 1800 Acts were passed. In subsequent legislation, broader
terms were used so that wars of insurrection received the same treatment
as wars between recognized states. For instance, in 1817 the words
"colony, district or people" were added to the expression "any foreign
prince or state" to describe parties in whose service vessels might not be
used, or against whom hostilities might not be committed.17 Following
the outbreak of the Spanish American wars of independence and with the
increased emphasis upon neutral duties arising out of the Napoleonic
wars in Europe, however, the prohibition of military expeditions was
incorporated into a more effective neutrality law enacted in 1818 (the
"1818 Act").18 Under section 6 of the 1818 Act, a crime was committed
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id. § 5.
14. 16 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
15. Id. at 324-25.
16. Act of Apr. 24, 1800, ch. 35, 2 Stat. 54.
17. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 370.
18. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 88, 3 Stat. 447. This Act codified and consolidated previous
Acts, namely the Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 and, the Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch.
58, 3 Stat. 370.
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if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the
United States, begin or set on foot, or provide or prepare the
means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on
from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign
prince or state, or of any colony, district or people, with whom
the United States are at peace .... 19
This provision was subsequently incorporated into the Revised Statutes
z°
in substantially similar form. In United States v. The Steamer Three
Friends,21 the Court stated that section 5286 of the Revised Statutes
covers all phases of hostile undertakings set on foot in [the
United States] by the fitting out of ships, by military expeditions,
by enlistments, or by commissions. This section 5286 is ap-
plicable in time of peace as well as in time of war, in time of
recognized war as well as in time of unrecognized war, and it
must be admitted embraces the whole field of hostile operations.
It makes it a crime against the laws of the United States to
begin on our soil such hostile operations or to carry them on
from hence.22
The provisions of the statute were incorporated into the codification,
revision, and amendment of the Criminal Code in 190923 and amendments
to the Criminal Code in 1917.24 The Criminal Code was amended by
19. Act of Apr. 20, 1818 § 6, 3 Stat. 447 (emphasis added). This Act also prohibits the
following activities: acceptance and exercising of foreign commissions by United States
citizens within the United States, id. § 1; enlisting or hiring others to enlist or leave the
country with intent to be enlisted, id. § 2; fitting out or arming vessels to be employed in
the service of any foreign prince or State or of any colony, district or people, to cruise or
commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens or property of any foreign prince or State
or of any colony, district or people with which the United States are at peace. Id. § 3.
20. Title 67 of the Revised Statutes, headed "Neutrality," § 5286 (1878). This section
creates two offenses. Firstly, the setting on foot, within the United States, of a military
expedition, to be carried on against any power (prince, state, colony, district, or people),
with whom the United States are at peace. Secondly, providing the means for such an
expedition. The text of this section is reprinted in Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
647 (1896).
21. 166 U.S. 1 (1897).
22. Id. at 16.
23. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 13, 35 Stat. 1090.
24. Art of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 5, § 8, 40 Stat. 223. Chapter 11 of the Act of May
7, 1917, amended section 10 of the Criminal Code to permit enlistment within the United
States of nationals of a country engaged in war with a country with which the United States
is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen
of the United States to enlist or go beyond the jurisdiction of the United Sates with intent
to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country.
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adding to the punishable acts, the preparation and furnishing of money
for military or naval expeditions. 25 In addition, the Criminal Code pro-
vided that the penalties of fine and imprisonment may be imposed con-
currently.26
B. Current Legislation: The Foreign Relations Act
As exemplified above, the Criminal Code historically prohibited and
punished violations of the Neutrality Act. Today, acts likely to prejudice
the United States in its international relations are prohibited and pun-
ished in the Foreign Relations Act.27 Section 959, entitled "Enlistment
in foreign service," 2 represents the standard treatment of foreign military
enlistments or expeditions. The statute prohibits anyone in the United
States regardless of nationality, from enlisting, recruiting or leaving the
United States in order to serve any foreign prince, state, colony, district
or people whether as a soldier, marine or seaman.29 Section 959 of the
Foreign Relations Act provides:
Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or
hires or retains another to enlist or enter himself, or to go
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be
enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, State,
colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman
on board any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.30
Under section 959, the essential elements of the crime are the
enlistment or recruitment within the United States territory or jurisdic-
tion of any resident person for service in the armed forces of a foreign
state or nation.3 In addition, section 959 creates an offence for de-
parting from the United States with the intent to enlist in a foreign
army.3"
The crime of departing from the United States with the intent to
25. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 9, 35 Stat 1089.
26. Act of May 7, 1917, ch. 11, § 10, 40 Stat. 39.
27. Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 956-60 (1988).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 959 (1988).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 959(a) (emphasis added). This provision is based on 18 U.S.C § 22 (1940).
For application of this section, see 7 G. HACKWORTh, DIO. lrt'L L. 404-13 (1943).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988).
32. Id.
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enlist in a foreign army has posed problems of interpretation for the
United States courts. In Wiborg v. United States, the Court held that the
government had no power to prevent its citizens from joining foreign
armies if they did so outside the United States jurisdiction.33  In other
words, it was not an offence against the laws of the United States for a
citizen or other person (resident alien), to go to a foreign country for the
purpose of joining in military operations carried on between other
countries or between different parties in the same country.3 The district
court judge in Wiborg expressed this position in the following jury
instruction:
[Il]t was not a crime or offence against the United States under
the neutrality laws of this country for individuals to leave this
country with intent to enlist in foreign military service, nor was
it an offence against the United States to transport persons out
of this country and to land them in foreign countries when such
persons had an intent to enlist in foreign armies .... 1
The Court's rationale for its decision in Wiborg was based on where
the actual act of enlistment occurred. To the same effect, the legal
adviser of the State Department, in trying to justify the presence of
United States ex-servicemen fighting on the side of Allied forces during
World War II, wrote in 1940, "Our law does not prohibit an American
citizen outside the United States from enlisting in the military forces of
a foreign belligerent. If an official of the government serving in a
foreign country should resign his office, he would then be in the same
position as a private citizen."' s As a result, the United States, has in the
past not only failed to prosecute returning United States mercenaries, but
also has aided in their repatriation and has strongly protested against
33. 163 U.S. 632, 655-56 (1896).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 653; cf. United States v. The Steamer Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897) (It is
an offense for any insurgent group, although not yet recognized as belligerent, to act
together to equip a vessel to cruise against and to conduct hostilities against a foreign state
that is at peace with the United States.); United States v. O'Brien, 75 F. 900 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1896) (One is prohibited, while within the United States, from enlisting as or recruiting
others to enlist as a soldier of a foreign power, but is free to travel outside the United
States to do so.); United States v. Nunez, 82 F. 599 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) (Although their
ultimate use may be military, the transportation of goods and the carriage of persons is not
prohibited, provided such transportation is without military features, such features being the
organization of men to act together, the presence of weapons, and some form of
leadership.).
36. Memorandum from Legal Advisor, Hackworth, United States Department of State
to the United States Secretary of State, Hull (June 22, 1940), quoted in 11 M. WHrrEMAN,
DIo. INT'L L. 242-43 (1968).
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their maltreatment by the victim countries' courts.37
Commentators have suggested, however, that the objective of the
United States neutrality laws is to prevent the foreign enlistment and
recruitment of American citizens solely within the United States borders,
rather than to prohibit an individual from leaving the United States to
enlist in such a force overseas.3s Furthermore, although it would be
possible to restrictively interpret the term "soldier," put forth in section
959(a) of the Foreign Relations Act, to exclude "civilian advisers,"
American citizens found in Angola and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were
certainly considered mercenaries. And in Gayon v. McCarthy,39 the Court
held that even an informal engagement with no more than the prospect
of advancement of funds or payment in the future was sufficient to
violate the United States neutrality laws.4
Exceptions to the enlistment prohibition contained in section 959(a)
do exist. Under section 959(b), the ban does not apply to nationals of
a belligerent allied to the United States:
This section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country
engaged in war with a country with which the United States is
at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country
37. The State Department sought the release of Orton W. Hoover, an United States
aviator, arrested in 1930 while aiding Brazilian Government forces against the Vargas
Revolution, and arrested again in 1932 while helping the Sao Paulo militia in an abortive
rebellion against Vargas. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1930, at A9, col. 3; id., Nov. 7, 1930, at
AS, col. 2; id., Nov. 13, 1930, at A2, col. 4; id., Oct. 21, 1932, at A7, col. 4. The State
Department also attempted to prevent the death penalty from being carried out against
Harold B. Dahl, an United States pilot being arrested by the Franco fascist forces in 1937.
See id., Sept. 3, 1937, at A3, col. 7; id., Sept. 4, 1937, at A4, col. 4; see also Borchard, The
Power to Punish Neutral Volunteers in Enemy Armies, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 536-37 & n.5
(1938).
To the best of the author's knowledge, no attempts have been made to arrest, let
alone prosecute, returning mercenaries who fought in Angola, although the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI") had investigated the matter. On the contrary, the then Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger, at a press conference, strongly criticized the execution on July
10, 1976 of Daniel Gearhardt, an United States citizen convicted of mercenary activities by
an Angolan court. See 75 DEP'T ST. BULL 163 (1976); Mercenaries in Africa: Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations, of House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong. 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976) (statement of William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs) [hereinafter Mercenaries Hearings], reprinted in McDowell,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
133, 140 (1977).
38. See, e.g, Hinds, The Legal Status of Mercenaries.. A Concept in International
Humanitarian Law, 52 PHIL. LJ. 395, 408 (1977); Cesner & Brant, supra note 5, at 358.
39. 252 U.S. 171 (1920) (involving the recruitment of a sailor, recently retired from the
United States Navy and unemployed, in the force raised by Felix Diaz against the
government of Mexico).
40. Id at 177-78.
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shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or go
beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to enlist
or enter the service of a foreign country.
41
The enlistment prohibition contained in section 959(a) is also qualified
by a proviso that friendly ships of war or privateers, which at the time
of their arrival in the United States were fitted and equipped as such,
may enlist persons of their own nationality for service on board.42 These
ships are considered to be "transiently" within the United States and thus
fall under the exemption set forth in section 959(c) as follows:
This section and sections 960 and 961 of this title shall not apply
to any subject or citizen of any foreign prince, state, colony,
district, or people who is transiently within the United States and
enlists or enters himself on board any vessel of war, letter of
marque, or privateer, which at the time of its arrival within the
United States was fitted and equipped as such .... 43
Other sections of the Foreign Relations Act deal with similar matters
relevant to neutrality and good relations with foreign states. Under Sec-
tion 956, entitled "Conspiracy to injure property of foreign govern-
ment, " 44 subsection (a) proscribes conspiracy within the jurisdiction of the
United States to injure or destroy the property of a foreign government
with which it is at peace:
If two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States conspire to injure or destroy specific property situated
within a foreign country and belonging to a foreign government
or to any political subdivision thereof with which the United
States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge or other public
utility so situated, and if one or more such persons commits an
act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to the conspiracy
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both. 5
41. 18 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
42. Id. § 959(c).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 956.
45. Id. (emphasis added). In United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
where the section was enforced, the defendants were charged with conspiring within the
United States to destroy a railroad bridge in Zambia and committing several acts in
furtherance of that conspiracy within the United States. The destruction of this bridge
would have effectively halted the supply of Zambian copper to the world market. Hence,
[Vol. 10
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Moreover, section 957 makes it an offence to possess "property or papers
used, designed, or intended for use in violating any penal statute, or any
of the rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty or the
law of nations.""6
Prosecution of mercenaries is also possible under section 958 which
makes it an offence for any citizen of the United States to accept and
exercise a commission to serve a foreign state which is at war with a
state currently at peace with the United States.47 A key issue pertaining
to this provision is whether recruitment of mercenaries including, inter
alia, the offering of enlistments, can be interpreted as the constructive
acceptance and exercise of a "commission" from someone, even in the
absence of evidence of express acceptance.
Section 960 addresses expeditions against foreign friendly nations.
48
It expressly prohibits the launching of a military or naval expedition from
the United States against any nation with which it is at peace:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on
foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money
for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise
to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion
of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or
people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined
not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.49
In interpreting this provision, the essential features of military operations
are characterized as "concert of action, unity of action, by a body
organized and acting together, acting by means of weapons of some kind,
acting under command, leadership." 0 As to the meaning of the phrase
"at peace" under section 960, in United States v. Elliott,5 the court held
that the phrase is to be interpreted as it is commonly understood.52 For
purposes of this section, it would then appear that the United States was
"at peace" with, for example, Angola and Rhodesia during their struggle
for independence in the 1970s.
the defendants expected to profit economically from the ensuing copper shortage.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 957 (1988).
47. Id. § 958.
48. Id § 960.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. United States v. Nunez, 82 F. 599, 601 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896).
51. 266 F. Supp. 318 (1967).
52. Id. at 322.
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C. The Immigration and Neutrality Act & The Foreign Agents
Registration Act
Perhaps more important than the fines or imprisonment terms
proscribed by the Foreign Relations Act, is the provision in 8 U.S.C. §
1481 which calls for the loss of nationality by a United States citizen who
voluntarily performs acts in violation of § 1481(a) with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationality. s3 Such acts include "entering, or
serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces
are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons
serve as a commissioned or noncommissioned officer."54
Another United States statute pertaining to mercenary activity is the
Foreign Agents Registration Act."5 It concerns the activities of any for-
eign agent who may be involved in the enlistment or recruitment of
individuals within the United States. For example, a registered agent
who willfully fails to report an activity such as recruitment or enlistment
is subject to criminal penalties.5 6 During the Crimean War (1854-56),
Attorney General Cushing took vigorous steps against British recruitment
in the United States.57 He maintained that such recruitment was a
violation of the sovereignty and rights of the United States under
international law, even though infractions 6f the municipal law of the
United States were ingeniously avoided. 58 The Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act also provides that it is a criminal offense for any individual,
including an American citizen, to dispense any money within the United
States for or in the interest of a foreign agent.59 Finally, any person who
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988). This statute replaces the Immigration and Neutrality Act
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 349(a)(3), 66 Stat. 267, 268 (1952) (codified as amended 8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1988)). The 1952 Act and the previous § 1481(a)(3) provided for the
loss of nationality by a United States national who was found guilty of entering, or serving
in, the armed forces of a foreign state without the prior express written authorization from
both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Id. The voluntary relinquishment
requirement of the current § 1481(a)(3) was added to the statute subsequent to the
Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). In Afroyim, the Court
held that because United States citizenship is an absolute constitutional right, an act of
Congress may not forcibly deprive a person of his citizenship unless the citizen himself
voluntarily abandons it. Id. For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 180-87
and accompanying text.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1988).
55. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1988).
56. Id. § 618(a)(2).
57. Dumbauld, Neutrality Laws of the United States, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 258, 264 n.37
(1937) (quoting S. ExEc. Doc. No. 35, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1855)).
58. Id. at 268-69.
59. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)(iii) (1988).
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represents the interests of a foreign principal breaches this provision. 6°
In general, persons doing any of the prohibited acts described above
are also subject to criminal liability for conspiring to commit offenses or
to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371.61 Violation of this
statute can result in a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to
five years, or both.62
IV. INTERPRETING UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION
The original objective of United States neutrality laws was to prevent
the recruitment and enlistment of American citizens for service in foreign
countries. This, in turn, would prevent the United States from unwilling-
ly participating in foreign conflicts. In United States v. Nunez, 63 the court
stated that the reason behind the neutrality laws was
to prevent entanglements between [the United States] and
foreign powers, by prohibiting expeditions from this country
interfering with beligerents, or with the relations between a
mother country and its insurgent people, in such a way as to
entangle [the United States], and become justly a subject of
contention, and in that way, if not checked, liable to lead [the
United States], into serious complications. 64
The real purpose of these neutrality laws, is to prohibit the commission
of unauthorized acts of war by private United States citizens because
these unauthorized acts may lead to acts of reprisals against the whole
nation, as well as to civil disunion.6 In United States v. Henfleld,66 the
court's jury charge articulated this concern:
If one citizen of the United States may take part in the [Anglo-
French War], ten thousand may. If they may take part on one
side, they may take part on the other; and thus thousands of our
fellow-citizens may associate themselves with different belligerent
powers, destroying not only those with whom we have no
60. Id § 611(c)(1)(iv).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
62. Id
63. 82 F. 599 (1896).
64. Id. at 599-600. For a discussion on the policy behind the United States Neutrality
Laws, see Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional
War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1983).
65. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1119 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
66. Id (Iredell, J., Peters, J., concurring).
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hostility, but destroying each other. ... As a citizen of the
United States, [Gideon Henfield] was bound to act no part which
could injure the nation; he was bound to keep the peace in
regard to all nations with whom we are at peace.67
In Three Friends, the Court emphasized that "no nation can permit
unauthorized acts of war within its territory in infraction of its sovereign-
ty, while good faith towards friendly nations requires their prevention."6
The same view was taken in United States v. Arjona,69 a decade earlier,
where the Court declared that "[t]he law of nations requires every
national government to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done
within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or
to the people thereof . . .,,0
In United States v. O'Sullivan,71 the court stated that "[tihe rule is
founded on the impropriety and danger of allowing individuals to make
war on their own authority, or, by mingling themselves in the belligerent
operations of other nations, to run the hazard of counteracting the policy
or embroiling the relations of their own government .... 72 Moreover,
Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren stressed that if the United
States is to remain a truly neutral party by avoiding controversies with
belligerents regarding interference with neutral rights, it must be
prepared to impose greater restrictions upon the activities of its citizens.
r3
[I]n order to keep out of war, it will be necessary . . . for the
United States to do far more than merely comply with its legal
obligations of neutrality. In order to avoid friction and complica-
tions with the belligerent, it must be prepared to impose upon
the actions of its citizens greater restrictions than international
law requires. It must also be prepared to relinquish many rights
67. ld. at 1119-20.
68. United States v. The Steamer Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 52 (1897).
69. 120 U.S. 479 (1887), quoted in SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10,
at 88 (Sept. 27) (Moore, J., dissenting) ("It is well settled that a State is bound to use due
diligence to prevent the commission within its dominion of criminal acts against another
nation or its people.").
70. Arjona, 120 U.S. at 484.
71. 27 F. Cas. 367 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 15,974).
72. Id. at 376. Similarly, Secretary of State Jefferson declared: "No citizen has a right
to go to war of his own authority; and for what he does without right, he ought to be
punished. Indeed nothing can be more obviously absurd, than to say that all citizens may
be at war, and yet the nation at peace." Jefferson to Mr. Morris, Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States with the Republic of France, Aug. 16, 1793, reprinted in 7 J. MOORE,
A DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 917 (1906). For further details, see Dumbauld, supra note
57, at 258-70, 261 n.19.
73. Warren, Troubles of a Neutral, 12 FOREIGN AFF. 377, 378 (1933).
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which it has heretofore claimed and asserted . . .74
One of the most acute problems with the United States neutrality
legislation is to determine what type of activity falls within the ambit of
the statutes. During the conflict in Angola (1975-76), 75 the recruitment
of United States citizens to fight as mercenaries against the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola ("MPLA"), prompted an
examination of the legal concept of "military or naval expedition or
enterprise." 76  It is unclear whether the concept applies only to an
organized fighting force departing from the United States territory to
fight against a nation with which the United States is at peace, or
whether it also applies to the "voluntary" departure of people from the
United States in a less organized group, to fight for a faction in the
internal conflict of a foreign country. In other words, the issue is
whether the United States recognition of belligerency is a necessary
element for the application of its laws and statutes.
A. Military Expeditions and Military Enterprises
The legal difference between a military expedition and a military
enterprise is very subtle. Nevertheless, the two terms constitute different
offenses. 77 A military expedition is comprised of two basic factors. An
association or organization must exist within the territory of the United
States, and it must have hostile intentions toward a foreign country.
In Wiborg, the Court defined a military expedition as "a journey or
voyage by a company or body of persons, having the position or
character of soldiers, for a specific warlike purpose ."78 Similarly,
Secretary of State Marcy emphasized that
what have been called expeditions organized within our limits for
foreign service have been only the departure of unassociated
individuals. Such a departure, though several may go at the
same time, constitutes no infringement of our neutrality laws, no
violation of neutral obligations, and furnishes no ground for the
arraignment of this Government by any foreign power. 79
74. Id
75. See supra note 1.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1988).
77. For a discussion of the difference between military expeditions and military
enterprises, see 7 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 398-99.
78. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 650 (1896).
79. Note from Secretary of State Marcy to Mr. Escalante (May 8, 1856), reprinted in 7
J. MooRE, supra note 72, at 927.
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The condition that individuals be unassociated when departing from
the United States for foreign service assumes that unless an actual
organization of a military character is in operation, a potential injury to
a foreign state or people may hardly be deemed to exist.80 Behind this
condition, there is the further assumption that an individual acting alone
may not seriously threaten the peace and security of a foreign state.8'
Therefore, the departure of individuals or of unorganized groups for the
purpose of joining the forces of the belligerent country is not a violation
of the law, and a duty of prevention need not be acknowledged. 82 This
concept was tested during the revolutionary years, when the Mexican
Government complained of military expeditions allegedly formed in the
United States with the purpose of overthrowing the existing regime. The
State Department called attention to the distinction
on the one hand between the passage of men singly and in small
groups across our frontier and into another country, or the
sailing of individuals or small groups in the ordinary course of
events from one of our ports, and on the other hand the
departure from our territory of organized groups of men avowing
the purpose of undertaking belligerent activities in foreign
territory.Y3
Consequently, the United States Government vigorously asserted that a
duty of prevention only existed in the case of the departure of organized
80. United States v. Tauscher, 233 F. 597, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), wherein the court
quoted, with apparent approval, Judge Judson's charge to the jury in O'Sullivan that before
a jury could convict "it must be proved to their satisfaction that the expedition or enterprise
was in its character military; or in other words, it must have been shown by competent
proof that the design, the end, the aim, and the purpose of the expedition, or enterprise,
was some military service, some attack or invasion of another people or country, State or
colony as a military force." United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 F. Cas. 367, 381 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1851) (No. 15,974); see also Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 650.
81. But see United States v. Ram Chandra, 254 F. 635, 636 (N.D. Cal. 1917) ("I see no
reason, however, why a single individual may not begin or set on foot a military expedition,
or enterprise, and more especially why a single individual may not well provide or prepare
the means for such an expedition or enterprise.").
82. Memorandum from Lansing, Counselor for the United States Department of State
to Count von Bernstroff (Oct. 6, 1914), quoted in 7 G. HAcKwoRTH, supra note 30, at 412.
83. Note of the Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Ambassador Sefior de
Zamacona (June 7, 1911), 7 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 410-11. It is also well known
that in 1870, during the Franco-German War, 1200 Frenchmen were allowed to depart from
New York in two French steamers for the purpose of joining the French army. Although
the vessels also carried 96,000 rifles and 11,000,000 cartridges, the United States did not
interfere, because the men were not organized in a body, and the arms and ammunition
were carried in the way of ordinary commerce. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
TREATISE 704-05 n.4 (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952).
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groups from its territory.
This distinction between the departure of organized and unorganized
groups from United States territory has formed the basis of the United
States law on the subject and has been applied with consistency. As
early as 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson addressed a note to
the Minister of France forcibly stating that "the government of the
United States will not at the request of a foreign government intervene
to prevent the transit to the country of the latter of persons objec-
tionable to it unless they form part of a hostile military expedition." 4
More than a century later, the court in United States v. Pena,85
interpreted the purpose of section 5286 of the Revised Statutes as
follows:
This section of the neutrality act does not prohibit the shipping
of arms, or ammunition or of military equipments to a foreign
country, nor does it even forbid one or more individuals, singly
or in unarmed associations, from leaving the United States for
the purpose of joining in any military operations which are being
carried on between other countries, or between different parties
in the same country.8
In 1911, the distinction between organized and unorganized groups was
still alive. Replying to complaints from the Mexican Embassy in Wash-
ington alleging that plots were being roused along the Mexican side of
the United States-Mexican border with the intent to launch attacks on
Mexican territory, United States Secretary of State Knox declared to
Mexican Ambassador Sefior DeZamacona:
In this connection I must again repeat to Your Excellency that
not only is there no rule of international law requiring, and no
local Federal statute that would permit, the Federal officials of
this Government to prevent the passage into foreign territory of
unarmed and unorganized men either singly or in groups, but, on
the contrary, it is an express provision of international law that
the responsibility of a neutral power is not engaged even in time
of recognized war by the fact of persons crossing the frontier
separately to offer their services to one of the belligerent; and
as to the mandates of municipal law, the courts of the United
States have repeatedly declared that our neutrality statutes do
84. Note from the Secretary of State, Jefferson, to the Minister of France, Morris (Nov.
30, 1793), reprinted in 7 J. MooRE, supra note 72, at 917.
85. 69 F. 983 (D. Del. 1895).
86. Id. at 984-85.
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not forbid one or more individuals singly or in unarmed,
unorganized groups from leaving the United States for the
purpose of joining in any military operations which are being
carried on between other countries or between different parties
in the same country.8
Thus, the responsibility of neutral states is not engaged if a number of
individuals, not organized into a body under a commander, start in
company from their territory for the purpose of enlisting with the
belligerent country. This rule was reflected in the classical law of na-
tions manifested by the practice of states and was recognized by the
United States, a country which imposes no duty of prevention upon a
neutral state. As one commentator stated in 1915:
No act . . . could be more clearly unneutral than that of a
citizen of a neutral country in going abroad and enlisting in the
military or naval service of a belligerent; and yet this is an act
which a neutral government is not obliged to prevent, and
neutral governments do not in fact undertake to prevent it.88
The assumptions upon which the United States law was based were
87. Reprinted in 7 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 410-11; cf. Havana Convention on
Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, T.S. 845, reprinted in 2 C. BEVANS,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATiONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNrITED STATES OF AMERiCA 1776-
1944, 727 (1969). "Neutral States shall not oppose the voluntary departure of nationals of
belligerent states even though they may leave simultaneously in great numbers; but they may
oppose the voluntary departure of their own nationals going to enlist in the armed forces."
Id. The War Department Rules of Land Warfare, Nos. 372, 373, of 1940 declared that
individuals crossing the frontier singly or in small bands that are unorganized, create no
obligation on the part of a neutral state, and that nationals of a belligerent are permitted
freely to leave neutral territory to join the armies of their country. It may be observed that
by the Declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939, those Republics resolved to prevent the
enlistment for service abroad within their own territory, declaring that they "shall prevent,
in accordance with their internal legislations, the inhabitants of their territories from
engaging in activities capable of affecting the neutral status of the American Republics."
Id at 608. On Feb. 20, 1928, a convention was adopted which generally prohibited
intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Article I of the Convention on the
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife goes further, obliging the
contracting states: "To use all means at their disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their
territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering elements, crossing the boundary
or sailing from their territory for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife."
Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20, 1928,
46 Stat. 2749, T.S. 814, 134 L.N.T.S. 45, 51, reprinted in 5 M. WHrrEMAN, DIG. INT'L L. 272
(1965).
88. Letter from John Bassett Moore to Hon. Benjamin Strong, Jr., Governor, Federal
Reserve Bank, New York City, Aug. 26, 1915, reprinted in Munitions Industry Hearing before
Special Comm. of the Senate Investigating the Munitions Industry, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 25,
Exhibit 2141.
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faithfully reflected in the Second Hague Convention in 1907,89 which
states, "The responsibility of a neutral power is not engaged by the fact
of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one
of the belligerents." 9 An argumentum a contrario supports the conclusion
that a neutral party is actually involved when it allows men to cross its
frontier in a body in order to enlist in the forces of a belligerent.
To appreciate the full impact of article 6, it must be compared with
article 4 of the Convention which provides, "Corps of combatants cannot
be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral
Power to assist the belligerents." 91 When these two provisions are viewed
together, the neutral state must prevent its frontier from being crossed
by corps or bands which have already been organized on its territory, but
may remain indifferent with respect to individuals acting in an isolated
manner. 92 In other words, two different situations must be considered
when dealing with subversive activities against foreign states. One situ-
ation arises when these subversive activities are committed by private
individuals. The other arises when the activities are committed by org-
anized persons, for example, by a concerted, armed, and hostile expedi-
tion.
Although a state does not have a duty to prevent and suppress the
commission of acts injurious to foreign states that are perpetrated by
unorganized private persons within its territory, a state is under an
obligation to prevent these injurious acts when they are committed by
organized groups.93 The prevailing international law governing subversive
activities against foreign states provides:
States are under a duty to prevent and suppress such subversive
activity against foreign Governments as assumes the form of
armed hostile expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes
against life or property. Moreover, while subversive activities
against foreign States on the part of private persons do not in
principle engage the international responsibility of a State, such
activities when emanating directly from the Government itself or
indirectly from organizations receiving from it financial or other
assistance or closely associated with it by virtue of the Constitu-
89. 1907 Hague Convention Number V, Respecting the Rights & Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, opened for ratification Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. 537,
36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Second Hague Convention], reprinted in 2 W. MALLOY, TREATIES
2290 (1910); 2 Am. 3. INT'L L. 117 (1908).
90. Second Hague Convention supra note 89, art. 6.
91. Id. art. 4.
92. Id.
93. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 83, at 292-93 (8th ed. 1955).
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tion of the State concerned, amount to a breach of international
law.94
It is acknowledged that neutral states have long recognized the
principle that it is their duty as well as their right to prevent the
commission, within their territories, of acts injurious to foreign states or
peoples with whom they are at peace. The duty of prevention, however,
has a wide scope of application. Broadly speaking, it applies to attempts
to commission, hire, retain or induce on neutral soil, others of any
nationality to enter into belligerent service. It is likewise applicable to
the retaining, hiring or inducing of others to go outside of neutral
territories with the intent to enlist or enter into such service, as well as
to the case of enticement of others by false representations to go outside
the jurisdiction of a neutral territory with the intent that such persons
may while there, through inducement or otherwise, enlist or enter into
the belligerent service. Indifference by a neutral power, that is, not
exercising due diligence to prevent its citizens or foreigners residing
thereof from committing injurious acts to friendly foreign states or
peoples, would serve to cause its territory to become a direct means of
injuring a state or people with which friendly relations are maintained.
In other words, neutral tolerance necessarily signifies connivance, and
hence, governmental participation in the conflict:
But when viewed positively, the wrongful act of the State
appears to consist in complicity in hostile attacks on friendly
States. The authorized and direct complicity of the government
in the expedition itself has been excluded as actual war. The
negligence and carelessness of the State, however, in the
prevention of such enterprises amounts to virtual complicity in
the undertaking. If there is such an attitude on the part of the
government as indicates a disregard of its international obliga-
tion, it may be considered as having consented to the attack
which is to be made; it may even be regarded as assisting in the
hostilities by protecting the persons engaged, and allowing them
its territory as a base for organization. If the sovereign has
knowingly suffered the harm to be done to another State, it may
be said to be an accomplice in the act itself.95
Thus, the curious paradox of not compromising a state's responsibility
94. Id. (emphasis added); cf. 3 J. ScOTr, THE PROCEEDINS OF THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCE 51-52 (1921).
95. Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States, 8 AM.
I. INTL L. 1, 36 (1914).
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even if its territory and resources are being used as a base for organiza-
tions, operations, and training of "unorganized" individuals, can only be
understood in light of laissez passer, laissez faire conceptions of pre-war
international law.
The second factor necessary for the existence of a military expedition
is the presence of a common design of hostile operation against a
friendly foreign state.96 This condition would seem to follow logically for
if a hostile criminal intent is lacking, no injury to the foreign state in
question may be said to exist. Generally speaking, under the relevant
statutes and case law, if these two factors are not present, the United
States is unwilling to recognize the existence of a military expedition and
consequently, a duty of prevention does not arise. As the Supreme Court
stated in Wiborg, "A military expedition or enterprise does not exist
unless there is a military organization of some kind ...officered and
equipped for active hostile operations."
97
In marked contrast to a military expedition, a military enterprise is
more comprehensive in scope. In Wiborg, the Court defined a military
enterprise as "a martial undertaking, involving the idea of a bold,
arduous and hazardous attempt." 98 Clearly then, while a military expe-
dition might conceivably be included in this definition, the concept of a
military enterprise gives a broader scope to the statute than just its
application to military expeditions. Moreover, a military enterprise may
consequently include various undertakings not only by a number of
persons, but also by a single individual, 99 provided the existence of an
organization of a strict!y military character is absent.
B. Belligerency
In recognition of the preceding considerations, the United States has
enforced its neutrality laws, which include the prohibition of military
expeditions in cases of insurgency where recognition of belligerency has
not been granted. Thus, on June 12, 1895, President Cleveland of the
United States issued a formal proclamation informing United States
citizens that the island of Cuba was "the seat of serious civil disturbances
accompanied by armed resistance to the authority of the established
government of Spain, a power with which the United States are and
desire to remain on terms of peace and amity."'" This proclamation
further declared:
96. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 653 (1896).
97. Id. at 650.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Sander, 241 F. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
100. Quoted in United States v. The Steamer Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1897).
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[T]he laws of the United States prohibit their citizens, as well as
all others being within and subject to their jurisdiction, from
taking part in such disturbances adversely to such established
government, by accepting or exercising commissions for warlike
service against it, by enlistment or procuring others to enlist for
such service ... and by setting on foot or providing or preparing
the means for military enterprises to be carried on from the
United States against the territory of such government .... 101
In President Cleveland's annual message of December 2, 1895, he warned
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to refrain from
forming or taking part in military expeditions in violation of the
neutrality laws. 101 The President issued another proclamation on July 27,
1896, and gave an extended review of the continuing insurrection in Cuba
during his annual message on December 7, 1896.103 American courts
considered these proclamations as sufficiently authoritative sources for
interpreting the United States neutrality laws. For example, the validity
of the President's proclamations was upheld in the Three friends case.'04
In this case, however, the Court sustained the seizure of a vessel that had
been supplied and armed for the purpose of aiding the Cuban insurgents
against the Spanish colonial regime.1 5 In analyzing the seizure, the
Court applied the statutory section prohibiting the fitting-out of ships to
cruise or commit hostilities to a state of insurgency not recognized as
belligerency, which was war in a material sense though not in a legal
sense.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Fuller stated,
"We see no justification for importing into section 5283 [of the Revised
Statutes] words which it does not contain and which would make its
operation depend upon the recognition of belligerency . . . ."16 The
Court declared that the United States Government was in a state of
peace with Spain and that the political department of the United States
Government had recognized the existence of insurrectionary war between
Spain and her colonists in Cuba. 101 Thus, the Court stated:
We are thus judicially informed of the existence of an actual
101. Id. at 64.
102. Id. at 65.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 64-65.
105. Id. at 68.
106. Id. at 66.
107. Id. at 65.
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conflict of arms in resistance of the authority of a government
with which the United States are on terms of peace and amity,
although acknowledgement of the insurgents as belligerents by
the political department has not taken place; and it cannot be
doubted that, this being so, the [neutrality] act in question is
applicable. 108
Furthermore, the legal significance of these proclamations lies in the
fact that the prohibition of hostile military expeditions was regarded as
a duty stemming from accepted principles of international law. These
principles of international law undoubtedly stipulate that a neutral state
must maintain an attitude of strict impartiality towards a belligerent in
the event of a war. 109 Included in this obligation is the duty of a neutral
state not only to abstain from participating in the conflict, but also to
refuse the use of its territory and resources for the organization of military
expeditions against friendly foreign states."'
In the Santissima Trinidad case, the Court held that a colony, not
recognized as a state by the United States, but involved in a civil war
with Spain, had the status of a belligerent nation, and that its vessels of
war were vested with the character of ships of state."' As Justice Story
stated:
The government of the United States has recognized the
existence of a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has
avowed a determination to remain neutral between the parties,
and to allow to each the same rights of asylum, and hospitality
and intercourse. Each party is, therefore, deemed by us a bellig-
erent nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights
of war, and entitled to be respected in the exercise of those
rights. We cannot interfere to the prejudice of either belligerent
without making ourselves a party to the contest, and departing
from the posture of neutrality."'
With respect to a civil war, the law is founded on the obligation of
every state to respect, in peace and in war, the independence, territorial
108. Id. at 65-66. A similar proclamation was issued on Mar. 2, 1912 with respect to
the Mexican Civil War. 2 DEAK & JESSUP, A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGU-
LATIONS, AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES 1200 (1939).
109. 7 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 30, at 372-79.
110. Id.
111. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336-37 (1822).
112. Id. at 337.
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integrity, and inviolability of other nations.113 In the event of inter-state
war, the obligation of a neutral state is one of impartiality. As applied
to a civil war, the obligation is one of non-interference in the conflict
regardless of whether a status of belligerency is recognized." 4 Whether
the state is confronted with a duty of impartiality or with one of non-
interference, the obligation to prevent hostile military expeditions from
departing from its jurisdiction remains the same. Hence, the prohibition
of hostile military expeditions is of a permanent character not exclusively
dependent upon the existence of an international war. The duty in-
volved, however, has been characterized as one of prevention, and it
proceeds largely upon the well-established theory that international law
confers upon every state a power of exclusive control over its territorial
domain. Concurrent with this obligation is the correlative duty to protect
within a territory the rights of other states, specifically, their right to
integrity and inviolability in peace and in war.' Therefore, the reason-
ableness of the claim of a state that respect be paid to its supremacy
within its own domain, as well as to its political independence and its
territorial integrity, depends upon its success in satisfying the full
measure of its obligations resulting from activities within its territory
which may have a direct effect upon foreign states and their nationals.
C. The Impact of IntemationaiLaw
The eminent question which arises is whether and to what extent
international law imposes upon a territorial sovereign the duty, within its
jurisdiction or within territories under its control, to endeavor to restrain
activities, which if unrestrained are bound to result in damage to foreign
states within their own territories or outside of the country where such
activities are initiated. States are therefore bound by well-recognized
principles of international law. These principles include non-intervention
in the internal affairs of other states, non-use of force in international
relations, and peaceful settlement of international disputes in order to
prevent a state's own citizens or any other persons from making use of
their territories or resources for hostile operations against any govern-
ment with which they are at peace and amity. In other words, there are
some activities or forms of conduct which a state should feel obliged to
endeavor to repress when the direct objective is the territorial integrity,
political independence or ordre public of a foreign state or people. As
113. Id. at 337-38.
114. Id.
115. See Arbitrator Huber's opinion in Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 829, 839 (1928); see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No.
10, at 98 (Sept. 27) (Moore, 3., dissenting).
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was declared by the Council of the League of Nations, in a resolution of
December 10, 1934, it is
the duty of every State neither to encourage nor tolerate in its
territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose; that every
State must do all in its power to prevent and repress acts of this
nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance to Govern-
ments which requested it."6
V. UNITED STATES ENFORCEMENT
The United States Government has long pursued a policy of non-
enforcement with regard to its neutrality laws. This is evident by the
mercenary activities engaged in by United States citizens in such conflicts
as World War I, the Spanish civil war, World War II, the Cuban crisis,
and the Angolan conflict.
A. World War I
The nominal deterrent of mercenary activity provided under the early
neutrality laws of United States was further undermined during World
War I. During this period, the United States Government modified its
neutrality laws, and in many instances simply failed to enforce them,
because great numbers of young United States citizens had volunteered
to fight for the Allied Powers prior to the United States entry into the
conflict. Thus, before the United States became a belligerent, its citizens
(or rather aviators) formed the "Escadrille Amiricaine" commanded by
French officers. 117
Subsequently, as a result of German Count Bernstorff's protests
against the presence of an United States squadron in the French air
force, the name was changed, first to that of the "Escadrille des Volo-
ntaires" and soon after (November 1916) to "Escadrille Lafayette." 8
Nothing was changed, however, save the name, and the squadron under
its new title continued to serve under the French flag until, upon the
United States declaration of war, it became the 103rd Pursuit Squadron
of the United States Air Service. 1 9  Because these United States
"volunteers" did not take an oath of allegiance to France, they did not
116. 15 LEAGUE OF NAnONS O.J. 1759 (1934). This statement was inspired by the
assassination of the King of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934, by terrorists who, it was
asserted, had been active on Hungarian soil.
117. J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RImmTS 462-63 (3d ed. 1947).
118. Id. at 463.
119. Id.
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lose their American citizenship. 120 No action was taken, however, to
punish these "citoyens Am6ricains engages au service de la France," or
"citoyens Amdricains volontaires pour la duree de la guerre."' 21
Following the conclusion of World War I, the United States
Government once again attempted to enforce its neutrality laws. In 1920,
a United States citizen was offered a commission to fight in the
revolutionary forces of Felix Diaz against the legally constituted Mexican
Government by a Mexican residing in the United States.'2 In Gayon v.
McCarthy, the Court affirmed Gayon's conviction for violating the
neutrality laws of the United States, reasoning that the act of recruiting
a United States citizen to join revolutionary forces in Mexico by
promising a commission was clearly a violation of the laws. 23
B. The Spanish Civil War
A significant reformulation of the United States neutrality laws
occurred as a result of the substantial involvement of United States
civilians in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). In response to the
recruitment and enlistment of several thousand United States citizens to
serve in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion of the International Brigade
during this war, Congress passed a new Neutrality Act t24 in November
1939. The Act reaffirmed the prohibition against leaving the United
States to enlist in foreign armed services.' 25 These young volunteers,
mostly members of the Communist or Socialist parties of the United
States, served in the Republican army of the Spanish Government to
prevent a Fascist takeover in that country. 126 The Roosevelt Administra-
tion did not openly support such enlistment. Although there were often
passport irregularities, 127 no violators were arrested, and United States
Customs Officers made no serious attempts to stop the exodus of these
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Gayon v. McCarthy, 252 U.S. 171 (1920).
123. Id. at 177-78. This decision is consistent with United States v. The Steamer
Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1896).
124. Current version at 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988) (concerning enlistment in foreign
service).
125. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the requirement of the non-intervention
principle led many states to complete their national legislation in order to prevent their
nationals from participating therein. See generally R. ROSENSTONE, CRUSADE OF THE LEFT.
THE LINcoLN BATIALtON IN THE SPANISH CML WAR 84-96 (1969).
126. Id. at 116.
127. Id. at 89-90. From 1936 to 1939, three thousand American leftists served in the
International Brigade; they came from every state in the United States, but their point of
departure in almost every instance was New York. Id. at 97-121.
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recruits as they embarked from New York, because the authorities had
previously done nothing to prevent United States citizens fighting on the
Fascist side.
C. World War II
Likewise, the United States Government did not take action against
those Americans who, before United States involvement, chose to join
armies who were fighting against the Axis powers in World War II.M
Thus, the Lafayette squadron of World War I reappeared in World War
II. Long before the United States became an active belligerent, after the
attack of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, United States citizens served
in three squadrons of the Royal Air Force ("RAF') as pilots.'" They
were called the "Eagle Squadrons."'13 These pilots were then transferred
to the United States Army Air Force ("USAAF') in September 1942.Y3
The exploits of the Eagle Squadrons in Western Europe were rivalled
by those of Colonel Chennault's Flying Tigers on the Chinese side
against Japan.1 2 Those who volunteered retained not only their United
States citizenship, but also the right to rejoin the service of their choice
without loss of rank when reabsorbed into the United States armed
forces.'33 This was accomplished with as little publicity as possible.
"'Chennault stressed the necessity for secrecy, pointing out the ticklish
international situation and the fact that the nation was at peace with
Japan. ' ' ' 34 Like the Eagle Squadrons, Chennault's Flying Tigers were
absorbed in the USAAF in the Summer of 1942.135
D. The Cuban Crisis
Generally speaking, the United States position of not prosecuting or
preventing its citizens within United States territory from enlisting or
recruiting in the service of foreign states, or from leaving the country
with the intent to do so, has not changed since World War II. The
United States response to mercenary activity during the Cuban crisis in
the 1960s serves as an illustration of this trend.
Following the abortive action in April 1961, against the newly
128. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 117, at 463-64.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 464.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 465 (quoting R. WHELAN, THE FLYING 'IGERS 20 (1942)).
135. Id.
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established Socialist Republic of Cuba by mercenaries who were
supported by Cuban refugees residing in the United States, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy, commenting on the "Bay of Pigs" invasion,
made a public statement on the applicability of the United States
neutrality laws: 136
There have been a number of inquiries from the press about our
present neutrality laws and the possibility of their application in
connection with the struggle for freedom in Cuba.... First, may
I say that the neutrality laws are among the oldest laws in our
statute books. Most of the provisions date from the first years
of our independence and, with only minor revisions, have
continued in force since the 18th century. Clearly they were not
designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world today.
... Second, the neutrality laws were never designed to prevent
individuals from leaving the United States to fight for a cause in
which they believed. There is nothing in the neutrality laws
which prevents refugees from Cuba from returning to that
country to engage in the fight for freedom. Nor is an individual
prohibited from departing from the United States, with others of
like belief, to join still others in a second country for an
expedition against a third country.... There is nothing criminal
in an individual leaving the United States with the intent of
joining an insurgent group. There is nothing criminal in his
urging others to do so. There is nothing criminal in several
persons departing at the same time. . . .What the law does
prohibit is a group organized as a military expedition from
departing from the United States to take action as a military
force against a nation with whom the United States is at peace.
.. There are also provisions of early origin forbidding foreign
States to recruit mercenaries in this country. No activities en-
gaged in by Cuban patriots which have been brought to our
attention appear to be violations of our neutrality laws. 137
A somewhat different attitude was adopted towards service in
revolutionary forces. After the Castro regime came to power in Cuba in
early January 1959, the American Embassy in Havana stated that while
United States citizens who fought as volunteers with the Cuban Revolu-
tionary Forces would not necessarily lose their United States citizenship,
"such persons who continue voluntarily to serve with these forces, if or
136. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Press Release (Apr. 20, 1961), reprinted in
5 WErrEMAN, supra note 87, at 275-76 (1965).
137. Id.
[Vol. 10
U.S. MERCENARY ACTIVITY
when they become an integral part of the armed forces of the Republic
of Cuba, are liable to expatriation under the provisions of" section
349(a)(3) and (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.1 This
was reiterated by the State Department shortly thereafter, on April 24,
1959, when it stated:
American citizens who served in the Cuban armed forces or the
Cuban Police Force, even though no oath of allegiance was
required, or who served in any other branch of the Cuban
Government for which service on oath of allegiance was
required, were subject to the loss of United States citizenship. 139
Thus, a distinction was made between serving in the revolutionary forces
of Castro and serving in the post-revolutionary Cuban army."' ° Serving
in the Cuban rebel army before Castro's rise to power had no ex-
patriatory consequences because the rebel army was at that time merely
a revolutionary force with no official status."' Serving in Cuba's post-
revolutionary army was considered service in the armed force of a foreign
state, and resulted in expatriation.
The significance of this became clear in United States v. Esperdy, 1
42
where an equally divided Court upheld a decision of the Second Circuit
expatriating Herman F. Marks by reason of his service in the Cuban
armed forces after the successful conclusion of the revolution and the
establishment of the Castro government. 4 3 Marks was a United States
citizen by birth.'" He went to Cuba in January 1958 to join Fidel
Castro's revolutionary forces fighting in the Sierra Maestra Mountains to
overthrow the government of Fulgencio Batista. 4 ' After the victory in
January 1959, Marks continued to serve as a Captain in charge of La
Cabana, a military prison and fortress in Havana, from January 1959 to
May 1960.'16 During these periods, the United States Government was
not yet hostile to the Castro Government. Following his disagreements
138. 8 WHrIEMAN, DiG. INTL L. 164, 173 (1967).
139. Id. at 173-74.
140. United States ec rel Marks v. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. 389, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd
in par, rev'd in pan, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), cen. granted, 375 U.S. 810 (1963), aff'd,
377 U.S. 214 (1964), reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964).
141. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. at 394.
142. 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
143. The Court was divided equally four to four, with Justice Brennan not participating
in the decision. Id.
144. Esperdy, 315 F.2d at 674.
145. Id.
146. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. at 393.
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with the Cuban authorities, Marks returned to the United States in July
1960. In January 1961, he was arrested and charged with unlawfully
attempting to enter the United States as an illegal immigrant. 147 It was
alleged that he was an alien who had lost his citizenship under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(3) 148 due to his service in the armed forces of Cuba without
prior written authorization from the Secretaries of State and Defense
after the successful conclusion of the Castro revolution and the establish-
ment of the Castro regime as the government of Cuba. Consequently,
Marks became an alien at the time of such service. 149 Counsel for Marks
argued that section 1481(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
under which he was deprived of his United States citizenship, was
unconstitutional because' it imposes cruel and inhuman punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment and is thereby beyond the legislative
power of Congress.5 0
In answering this argument, the Second Circuit stated, "Although we
find great force in the constitutional arguments presented by relator's
counsel, we are constrained by the'superior authority of Perez v. Brownell
.. to affirm the determination of alienage .. . .,, This is consistent
with the position of the United States during the Suez crisis (October
1956) concerning the implementation of section 349(a)(3) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952.152 Following the discovery of
Americans fighting on the side of the Israeli armed forces during the
1956 Suez crisis, the State Department issued a press release on
147. Esperdy, 315 F.2d at 674.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 675.
151. Id. at 675 (citation omitted). In this case, the district court stated:
The activity covered by section 349(a)(3) has a direct bearing upon foreign affairs
and international relations. Congress' enactment of the section is a legitimate
and reasonable exercise of its power to regulate the relations of the United States
with foreign countries. In Perez v. Brownwell . . . it was held by the Supreme
Court that the power of Congress to regulate foreign relations may reasonably
be deemed to include a power to deal with voting by American citizens in foreign
political elections, since Congress could find that such activities, because they
might give rise to serious international embarrassment, relate to the conduct of
foreign relations. . . . Experience amply attests that in this day of extensive
international travel, rapid communication and widespread use of propagandi, the
activities of the citizens of one nation when in another country can easily cause
serious embarrassments to the government of their own country as well as to
their fellow citizens.
Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. at 395 (emphasis added).
152. 35 DEtr. ST. BULL. No. 908 (Nov. 19, 1956), reprinted in 8 WHtrEMAN, supra note
138, at 171 (1967).
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November 10, 1956 stating:
In view of the current situation in the Near East the Department
of State desires to bring to the attention of all American citizens
the provisions of section 349(a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. . . .This section of the Act provides
that American citizens shall lose their citizenship by entering or
serving in the armed forces of a foreign state unless, prior to
such entry or service, the entry or service is specifically autho-
rized in writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense. Authorization has not so far been granted in any
individual case and there is no intention of departing from this
policy. 153
E. The Angolan Conflict
The applicability of the United States neutrality laws does not
depend on official recognition by the United States of a state of
belligerency or insurgency; these laws expressly apply to entities other
than states. 1 4 For example, at the time of the recruitment or enlistment
inside the territory of the United States of mercenaries to fight against
the MPLA forces, the United States Government had not recognized the
People's Republic of Angola as a sovereign state. Nevertheless, this fact
should not remove the statute's application to those persons because the
express terms of sections 959(a) and 960 of the Foreign Relations Act
apply to enlistment and recruitment in the service of "any foreign prince,
state, colony, district, or people."'
While choosing not to prosecute mercenaries, United States officials
continuously argued that they had no specific evidence of United States
mercenary activity in Angola. And without such evidence, the United
States Government could not enforce the neutrality laws.15 6 The United
States appeared hesitant to apply the penal clauses of the neutrality laws
153. Id.
154. In interpreting the neutrality statutes in the case of The Three Friends, the
Supreme Court stated, "[w]e see no justification for importing into section 5283 [of the
Revised Statutes] words which it does not contain and which would make its operation
depend upon the recognition of belligerency." United States v. The Steamer Three Friends,
166 U.S. 1, 66 (1897).
155. 18 U.S.C. §§ 959, 960 (1988).
156. "Regardless of what conduct is alleged to result in expatriation, whenever the issue
of voluntariness is put in issue, the Government must in each case prove voluntary conduct
by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence." Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
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and regulations. Enforcement was, at best, selective. Officials chose to
prosecute only when circumstances made such action particularly advan-
tageous to United States foreign policy goals.
A non-enforcement policy was pursued even though United States
recruiters publicly admitted that they were enlisting, recruiting, organiz-
ing, training, and paying Americans to provide medical assistance and to
fight as combatants with forces opposed to the MPLA in Angola. t'"
Moreover, although returning American citizens also publicly admitted to
customs officials and the mass media that they were fighting as mer-
cenaries on the side of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
("FNLA") and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
("UNITA") forces against the MPLA, they were not prosecuted due to
a lack of material evidence.5 8
In a statement before the House International Relations Special Sub-
Committee on Investigations on August 9, 1976, describing United States
law relating to the recruitment or enlistment of mercenaries, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Keuch stated "that in general it
is not unlawful for a citizen or other person in the United States to
leave the country with the intent to enlist abroad in a foreign military
service."5 9 Thus, if a person goes abroad and enlists in a foreign force,
he will not be subject to prosecution in the United States. It is the
retention and enlistment within the United States that constitutes a
crime. Under the present applicable law, the government is required to
prove that there was a retention and enlistment of an individual before
a recruiter who initiated the enlistment may be prosecuted. t60 In many
instances, however, the evidence necessary to convict a recruiter leaves
the country with the mercenary.
157. Disaster Assistance in Angola: Hearings on H.R 461-53 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Resources, Food and Energy of the House Comm on Int'l Relations, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess.
129-131 (1976) (Statement of Robert L. Keuch, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Disaster Assistance in Angola].
158. Id.
159. Id; cf. Assistant Secretary of State, William E. Schaufele, Jr., made the following
statement regarding the United States' position towards the mercenaries in Angola:
The recruitment of mercenaries within the Territory of the United States to serve
in the armed forces of a foreign country is an offense under our neutrality laws.
... [N]o Americans were recruited directly or indirectly by the U.S. Government
to fight in Angola. Those men were there on their own, without our advance
knowledge or approval. We attempted to discourage Americans from going to
Angola as mercenaries. Anyone who called us on the subject was given that
message clearly and distinctly.
Mercenaries Hearings, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of William Schaufele, Jr., Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1988).
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F. Constitutional Implications
In Perez v. Brownell,161 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940162 containing the provision
that a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by "[vioting in a political election
in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to deter-
mine the sovereignty over foreign territory ... ."16 Affirming the lower
court's decision that Perez expatriated himself by voting in a foreign
political election, the Court stated, "It cannot be said.., that Congress
acted without warrant when, pursuant to its power to regulate the
relations of the United States with foreign countries, it provided that
anyone who votes in a foreign election of significance politically in the
life of another country shall lose his American citizenship." 16 The Court
clearly rejected the notion that the power of Congress to terminate
citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent, and based its decision on
separation of powers concerns. "To deny the power of Congress to enact
the legislation challenged here would be to disregard the constitutional
allocation of governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn duty
to guard.'" 15 The decision of the Court in this case is consistent with the
doctrine that expatriation results from acts which unequivocally manifest
an intent to renounce allegiance. 166 Writing for the majority, Justice
Frankfurter stated that "it would be a mockery of this Court's decisions
to suggest that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or
desire to do so. ' '167
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Warren, joined by
Justices Black and Douglas, asserted that section 401(e) was unconstitu-
tional on two grounds. 1' First, the Constitution mandates that Congress
161. 356 U.S. 44, 46 (1958). The petitioner was born in Texas in 1909, and in 1919 or
1920 he moved to Mexico with his parents, where he lived apparently without interruption
until 1943; he also voted in a political election in Mexico. Id. at 46. In 1928, he was
informed that he had been born in Texas. He voted in a political election in Mexico. Id.
162. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(a)-(j), 54 Stat. 1137, 1168-69 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1964)).
163. Id. § 401(e) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1964)).
164. Perez, 356 U.S. at 62; cf Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (Court held that
denationalization as a punishment was barred by the eighth amendment to the Constitution,
and therefore unconstitutional.). The Perez Court did not view Congress's action in that
case as inflicting a punishment, but rather as a means of "regulating the relations of the
United States with foreign countries" and avoiding embarrassment with regard to such
relations. Perez, 356 U.S. at 62.
165. Id
166. Id at 61.
167. Id.
168. See infra notes 169-71.
19891
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
lacks the power to take away the citizenship of lawfully naturalized and
native born citizens.169 Second, as an exercise of that power, section
401(e) fails because it describes conduct which does not invariably involve
a dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandon-
ment of citizenship.170 Justice Douglas stated:
What the Constitution grants the Constitution can take away.
But there is not a word in that document that covers expatria-
tion. The numerous legislative powers granted by Art. I, § 8, do
not mention it. I do not know of any legislative power large
enough and powerful enough to modify or wipe out rights
granted or created by § 1, cl. 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment.
. . . Our decisions have never held that expatriation can be
imposed. To the contrary, they have assumed that expatriation
was a voluntary relinquishment of loyalty to one country and
attachment to another."7 '
Perez v. Brownell and Marks v. Esperdy were overruled in Afroyim v.
Rusk.172 In Afroyim, the Court held that citizenship conferred by the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution is absolutely vested and not
subject to divestment by any branch of government unless the individual
"voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship."'173  In Afroyim, the Court
adopted the positions taken by the dissenters in Perez v. Brownell, 74 ten
169. Perez, 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 75-77.
171. Id. at 79-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The constitutionality of the 1907 Expatriation
Act was challenged unsuccessfully in MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). In that case,
the Supreme Court, while admitting that the Constitution does not expressly give Congress
the power to deprive a native American of his nationality, said, for the first time, that it was
an implied power necessary to avoid embarrassment and dual allegiance problems in the
conduct of foreign affairs. Justice McKenna, however, while carefully avoiding to hold
that Congress could denationalize a person without at least a presumption of an intent on
the part of the individual to surrender his citizenship, conceded that "a change of citizenship
cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen." Id.
at 311. In Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939), expatriation was clearly defined by Chief
Justice Hughes as "[t]he voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and
allegiance." Id. at 334. To the same effect, see Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491
(1950).
172. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
173. Id. at 268. This ruling, however, was weakened by the Court's subsequent ruling
in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), where the Court permitted Congress to strip
Bellei, who was naturalized overseas, of his citizenship because he did not satisfy the
conditions set forth in § 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The unanswered
question which remains, however, is whether enrollment in a military service other than that
of United States, and the swearing of an oath of allegiance, constitutes an express waiver.
174. 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958).
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years earlier.
Beys Afroyim was born in Poland in 1893, emigrated to the United
States in 1912, and became a naturalized citizen in 1926.175 After living
abroad, Afroyim went to Israel in 1950, where he voluntarily voted in an
election for the Israeli legislative body (the Knesset). 76  In 1960,
Afroyim's request for a renewal of his American passport was denied by
the State Department because, consistent with the Court's holding in
Perez, he had lost his citizenship by voting in a foreign political election
in violation of section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940.11 Afroyim
then sought a declaration that the statute under which his citizenship was
revoked was unconstitutional because it violated his due process rights.' 78
This argument was rejected by both the district court and the Second
Circuit which affirmed Perez and upheld the constitutionality of section
349(a)(5). 179 On appeal to the Supreme Court, however, Afroyim's
argument prevailed.'80 By a bare majority of five to four, the Court
repudiated Perez and denied Congress's power, express or implied, to
expatriate an American national without his concurrence, and subscribed
to the view advocated by Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opinion
in Perez.18' Writing for the majority, Justice Black rejected the view
espoused by the majority in Perez that
Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away
an American citizen's citizenship without his assent. This power
cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an implied attribute
of sovereignty possessed by all nations. .. . In our country the
people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.182
175. Afroyin, 387 U.S. at 254.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 255.
180. Id. at 268.
181. Id. at 267.
182. Id. at 257; cf Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Court held that
§ 4010) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, and § 349(a)(10) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 were invalid because Congress was given the power to employ
a sanction of deprivation of nationality as a punishment without affording the procedural
safeguards guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments.); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252 (1980) (Court held that Congress does not have any general power to take away an
United States citizen's citizenship without his assent, which means an intent to relinquish
citizenship, whether the intent is expressed in words or is found as a fair inference from his
conduct.).
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Thus, the Court found an act of Congress, which made voting in a
foreign election punishable by divestiture of citizenship, to be unconstitu-
tional under the fourteenth amendment.'t By overruling Perez and
Marks, the Court in Afroyim subordinates the foreign relations power of
the executive and legislative branches of the government, to the absolute
grant of citizenship contained in the fourteenth amendment.t8 Thus, the
Court has effectively authorized United States citizens to serve in the
armed forces of foreign states not engaged in hostilities with the United
States without losing their citizenship unless they clearly intend to
relinquish it.
This trend to authorize mercenary activity was expressed in a United
States Deputy Assistant Attorney-General Robert L. Keuch's statement
in 1976, interpreting the Afroyim decision.It Keuch indicated that an
American citizen could not be stripped of his citizenship by serving in a
foreign army unless he took an oath of allegiance to a foreign govern-
ment.ls 6 In Keuch's opinion, a declaration of intent going beyond a mere
enlistment in a foreign army must be made before there is an effective
renunciation of citizenship.1 7
In accordance with Keuch's interpretation, United States citizenship
has not been divested from American citizens fighting in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, notwithstanding complaints from Arab states characterizing
the United States as a belligerent for refusing to deny such people their
citizenship. is Similarly, in United States v. Dane,189 the Ninth Circuit
went so far as to suggest that involvement in mercenary activities
outside United States jurisdiction does not constitute criminal activity and
therefore could not lead to automatic expatriation. 190
In 1980, the Supreme Court followed its decision in Afroyim in Vance
183. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
184. See idt
185. Disaster Assistance in Angola, supra note 157, at 131.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 253. See generally Disaster Assistance in Angola, supra
note 157, at 131.
189. 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), cen denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978).
190. Id. at 842. John Andrew Dane, a British national, pleaded guilty to a charge of
possessing illegal firearms. Id. He was later arrested for violating a special condition of
his parole not to trade, possess, or carry weapons, firearms, or explosives. Id. at 845. The
Court characterized his actions- handling guns in Mexico, having his personal weapons
shipped to him from the United States, and engaging in armed instructions in Rhodesia and
handling arms there - as evidence of the accused's return to mercenary life. Id. The Court
noted, however, that the acts in themselves were not alleged to violate United States law.
Id. at 844.
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v. Terrazas.191 The Court stated that
the intent of the fourteenth amendment, among other things was
to define citizenship; and as interpreted in Afroyim, that
definition cannot coexist with a congressional power to specify
acts that work a renunciation of citizenship even absent an intent
to renounce. In the last analysis, expatriation depends on the
will of the citizen rather than on the will of Congress and its
assessment of his conduct. 192
In Afroyim and Vance, the Court clearly departed from the long-
standing judicial maxim that nationality rights are only relative. There-
fore, their exercise and enjoyment may be affected by government's
restrictive policies in order to prevent dual nationality or divided
allegiance. And in the expatriation cases of Mackenzie v. Hare,193
Savorgnan v. United States,"" and Perez v. Brownell,195 severe sanctions
were limited to those individuals whose actions were most likely to create
dual allegiance problems, expose the state to a declaration of war, or
imperil its citizens. 96 Because the decisions in Afroyim and Vance permit
or facilitate dual nationality or divided allegiance, it appears inconsistent
with long-established United States policy and multilateral efforts to
discourage or limit dual nationality under international law. As a result
of these decisions, it seems that American citizens can easily manipulate
citizenship laws as they wish. As one commentator stated, "Americans
are now in the unique position of being able to turn citizenship on and
off as easily as they operate a water tap." 197
191. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
192. Id. at 260. The deference toward the will of the individual citizen can clearly be
seen in Congress's enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988). Section 1481(a) calls for loss
of nationality only if the individual performs an act in violation of the statute, with the
intention of relinquishing United States citizenship. Id.
193. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
194. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
195. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
196. See supra notes 92-173 and accompanying text.
197. Dionisopoulos, Afroyim v. Rusk. The Evolution, Uncertainty and Implications of a
Constitutional Principle, 55 MINN. L. REV. 235, 251 (1970); see also Duvall, Expatriation
Under United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American
Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REv. 408, 431-56 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law - Congress May
Provide for Expatriation as a Consequence of Service in the Armed Forces of a Foreign State,
31 FoRDHAM L. REV. 373, (1962); Comment, Constitutional Law -Expatriation for Wartime
Draft Evasion Is Punishment Requiring Fifth and Sirth Amendment Safeguards; Expatriation
for Service in Foreign Armed Forces Is Regulation, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1964).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of prosecutions of United States citizens who have served
as mercenaries is attributable to the position held by United States
authorities that not enough specific material evidence exists to pursue
these cases. This official position was clarified by Congressman Donald
Fraser, in a statement before the Fourth Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly on October 9, 1975.'9 In the statement, he
reiterated that under United States law, any citizen enlisting in the armed
forces of a foreign country runs the risk of losing his United States
citizenship and being subjected to criminal prosecution under existing
United States laws,'" which provide for fines and imprisonment if found
guilty. 200 In responding to the statements made by the Committee to the
effect that some United States citizens were fighting as mercenaries in
the Rhodesian Army, Mr. Fraser said that he would welcome "detailed
information" so that appropriate legal action could be taken as pre-
scribed by the law.201
While the United States position is acceptable and understandable,
it appears that the authorities have done very little to gather the
necessary evidence. Moreover, the lack of prosecution in this area is due
to the fact that American citizens normally participate in conflicts for
which the United States does not recognize belligerency, thereby making
it difficult for United States laws to apply. As the incident on the Island
of Dominica illustrates, however, prosecution is certain to take placem
when the interests of the United States are clearly at stake.
2f
In the specific laws preventing United States citizens from enlisting
in foreign fighting units, exceptions and loopholes exist. First, citizens of
the United States may enlist in the army of any ally of the United States
in times of war. Second, citizens of foreign states transiently in the
United States may also enlist. Third, enlistment in the service of a
198. Provisional Summary Record of the 2143rd Meeting, [1975] GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/C.4/SR.2143 1975 [hereinafter Provisional Summary Record].
199. Id. at 3.
200. Note, Leashing the Dogs of War. Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries,
22 VA. J. INT'L L 589, 596-97 (1982) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1976)).
201. Provisional Summary Record, supra note 198.
202. See Note, supra note 200.
203. In that case, American citizens who attempted to overthrow the government of
Prime Minister Mary Eugenua Charles were prosecuted. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, at A9,
col. 1. In 1981, United States authorities, in cooperation with Canadian authorities,
prevented and subsequently prosecuted a mercenary expedition aimed at overthrowing the
Government of Dominica. The operation was planned, financed and launched from within
United States territory. Id.; see also id., Apr. 29, 1981 at AS, col. 2. The operation
included Canadian and United States mercenaries and "members of the Ku Klux Klan and
neo-Nazi groups." Id., May 17, 1981, at A4, col. 1.
[Vol. 10
1989] U.S. MERCENARY ACTVJTY 307
foreign force or the hiring of others to do such act must take place
within the United States territory in order to infringe the law. Finally,
if United States citizens do engage in mercenary activity, they must do
so with the intent of relinquishing their citizenship; if not, they are
permitted to retain dual citizenship status.
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion
is that the United States neutrality laws are aimed at protecting the
country during times of weakness and do not lay down a general
principle to be followed. These laws do not prevent or deter American
citizens from enlisting, within or outside the jurisdiction of the United
States, as mercenaries to fight in Third World conflicts because it is not
in the interest of the United States to do so. The time has come for the
United States to review its policies regarding these issues give effect to
its laws to better respect the interests of other countries.

